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PREFACE
              Strategic planning, as we understand the term, concerns the methods and mechanics of waging
              war. It is the business of the professional military men . . . . The formulation of military policy,
 on the other hand, means to us the determination of whether and when and under what
              circumstances and for what purposes we should go to war. It concerns political decisions rather
              than military methods and is the business of the Congress and ultimately of the people in our
              democracy. 
From an editorial "Policy and Strategy" 
The Providence Journal 
September 19, 1949 
When the 104th Congress convened in January 1995, a long simmering debate came to a boil
              over a proposed display of the Enola Gay at the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum in 
Washington, D.C. The Enola Gay was the B-29 that dropped the atom bomb on Hiroshima on 6 
August 1945. Peace activists and some historians, who considered the bombing an American
              disgrace, favored graphic depictions and narratives describing the bomb's devastation. 
Veterans' groups and others objected. They wanted text material that explained what led to the
              bombing -- the already high American casualties in the Pacific War (150,000 killed or wounded
              on both sides in the battle for Okinawa alone) -- and note taken on the projected allied and
              Japanese casualties when Japan's home islands were invaded. 
Apologists for dropping the bomb base their case largely on the thousands of civilian casualties
              at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The inference was that not only were these civilian casualties, but
              innocent civilian casualties. 
This essay looks at the issue of civilian casualties in various types of armed conflict some 50
              years later and discusses a number of questions that are but logical extensions of the Enola Gay
 debate.
              In January of 1994, the U.S. Naval Institute published an article, "Getting It Right From . . . the
              Sea," by General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. While the article
              dealt with the effective and efficient use of naval expeditionary (task) forces, primarily with 
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              respect to regional conflicts, of equal interest was the way in which a commandant of the
              Marine Corps, perhaps the most no-nonsense branch of our armed forces, viewed (1) total and
              less than total wars, (2) collateral damage, (3) the use or non-use of various weapons in our
              arsenal, and (4) the political costs incurred when American armed forces are put in harms way.
              Not addressed, however, was whether senior military officers should share responsibility with
              political leaders, that is, become decision makers with regard to when and where to commit
 forces, with what weapons, and under what constraints. 
To quote General Mundy:
                           In addition, we cannot ignore the political ramifications of collateral damage that
                           even precision weapons can cause. In wars that are less than total-potentially,
                           most of our future wars-we may not be able to use weapons, however effective,
                           if their political cost outweighs their tactical gain. There may be a time and place
                           when near perfect accuracy just will not be good enough. That is not a pleasant
                           thought, but it is a consideration we cannot ignore when we look at new
                           systems and the application of existing technologies. (3) 
Questions: 
What difference, if any, is there between total war and less than total war? What
 are the implications for our armed forces, particularly our combat forces, if a
 distinction is made? 
Discussion: 
The model for total war is World War II. The London blitz, the bombing of
                           Coventry, Cologne, and Dresden, the siege of Stalingrad, the fire bombings of
                           Japanese cities and the later use of atomic weapons, leave no doubt about the
                           totality of the conflict. On the other hand, Korea, Vietnam, and the 1991 Gulf 
War were characterized by the restrained use of weapons and military options.
                           In total war, the goal of national leadership historically has been to bring about
                           the surrender or unconditional surrender of the enemy.(4) The objective military
                           function is to achieve this end at a minimum cost in lives and national treasure. 
Total war is also an unambiguous concept and generally understood by those
                           doing the fighting. Limited wars, on the other hand, imply limited goals and as
                           such are ambiguous and complex concepts. This ambiguity requires that the
                           nation's leaders, both civilian and military, constantly explain and rationalize the
                           reason for the conflict, a task which becomes increasingly difficult as time passes
 and, casualties mount. 
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Again quoting General Mundy: 
                           In the future, we will . . . be operating in a political environment in which there is
                           an "economy of will." The American people will not tolerate high casualties in
                           military operations they do not view as critical to our national security. Either
                           under U.N. auspices, or multilaterally-or even unilaterally-many of our likely
                           tasks will not affect the national security of the United States directly. Many of
                           our future operations are going to have objectives that-while important in a
                           regional sense-may not be seen as vital in Peoria.5 
While ambiguous and complex politics are fairly open to debate by the
                           electorate, from military tactics to broad issues of national policy, such debate
 cannot be limited to the home front. In an age of instant communication, the
                           issues will also be argued at every level of the military establishment. After all is
                           said and done, is the soldier, sailor and airman doing the fighting more willing to
                           fight, and possibly die, for something he understands than for something he
 does not? 
The use of limited military force and by definition, limited political objectives, has a poor track
              record in the West. Witness Korea, the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, Lebanon, Iran and Iraq. Our cold
              war adversaries, however, used whatever force was necessary to achieve their objectives. 
Witness the swift dispatch of the Czech and Hungary uprisings by the Soviet Union, the
              crushing of Tibet dissidents by the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and the more recent
              crushing of Chechnya's rebellion by Russian military forces. Afghanistan was a Soviet failure
              but only because the United States decided to contest the outcome. 
Question:
                           Is weaponry for total war significantly different than weaponry for less than
                           total war? Under what circumstances, if any, is the use of atomic weapons an
                           option? If there is a difference between weapons dependent upon what type of
                           conflict is being waged, what is the implication for defense spending?
 Discussion:
                           Improving weapon accuracy, that is, hitting what you aim at with a high
 probability of success, is certainly an acceptable goal of military research and
                           development. The more accurate the weapon, the less chance it will have to be
                           used a second or third time. The savings is easily identifiable in terms of lives
                           and material. The problem, however, is not with developing so-called smart
                           weapons but rather the argument that unless a weapon is highly accurate it
 should not be used at all, that is, cause collateral damage and kill innocent
                           civilians. 
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                           From this point the debate can be extended to what constitutes an acceptable
                           target. An ammunition factory, a bridge, a rail yard, an oil refinery, a column of
                           tanks, government complexes . . . ? However, as the number of targets grows,
                           as it will in all conflicts, the number of targets that can be more quickly
                           destroyed by conventional but less accurate weapons will also grow. In a total
                           war, no problem arises with respect to the choice of weapons. We use what
                           accomplishes the task with the least cost in lives and material. In less than total
                           war, however, an increasingly popular position is to use only accurate weapons
                           aimed at strictly military targets. Carried to a logical end, this raises the question
                           of how much money should be allocated to developing and producing
                           sophisticated, "civilian friendly" weapons and how much should be spent for
                           conventional weapons that are less accurate but more effective with respect to
                           most enemy targets. Should a target be destroyed by naval guns, cruise missiles,
 or long range artillery with a minimum risk to military personnel or should a
                           squadron of F-16s fitted with laser guided bombs be used with a much greater
                           risk to men and equipment . . . very expensive equipment and very expensive
                           men and women? 
As to the willingness to use atomic weapons, peace as between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact for the past 50 years was maintained not because a balance of
                           conventional forces existed but rather the assured mutual destruction of both
                           alliances should atomic weapons be used. While mass destruction weapons,
                           biological and chemical as well as atomic, are hardly civilian friendly, they
                           nonetheless kept the peace in Europe under the most trying of circumstances.
                           One might also ask-Is a fourth war between India and Pakistan more or less
                           likely now that both are atomic powers? Or would conflict between Taiwan and
                           Communist China be more or less likely if Taiwan, as well as the People's
 Republic of China, had nuclear weapons? 
Question: 
What is the distinction between armed conflict at whatever level and using our
                           armed forces as peacekeepers in combat areas? What implication does such a
                           difference have with respect to training doctrine? 
Discussion: 
The distinction between total war, less than total war, and peacekeeping as a
                           military operation is simply one of degree. In total war, the use of available
                           weapons is seldom constrained. Civilian casualties, innocent and otherwise, are
                           accepted. In less than total war the use of available weapons is constrained while
                           political goals constrain military options. In the role of peacekeepers, our armed
                           forces must adapt to the role of a typical police force. When deadly force may be
                           used is tightly proscribed . . . generally not to fire until fired upon. While we
                           have not come to the point of "Mirandizing" a potential enemy . . . we are
                           coming very close. 
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                           Developing a training doctrine for combat forces across a range of conflict
                           situations is no easy task, if it can be accomplished at all. Infantry basic training
 which for the moment, still includes instruction in hand to hand combat where
                           the objective is to kill or be killed, is hardly an option when the mission is to
                           disarm an enemy but in no case do him bodily harm. Few would point to
 Somalia and Bosnia as success stories wherein military forces were used in a
                           peacekeeper role. 
Question: 
What is the definition of collateral damage? Correspondingly, is there such a
                           thing as innocent civilians in war, no matter what the conflict may be called?
 Discussion:
                           Collateral damage is "spillover" damage inflicted on adjacent or nearby
                           structures and populations when the intended target is destroyed or damage
                           caused when the intended target is only partially destroyed or missed entirely.
                           Collateral damage becomes visible and controversial when it includes civilian
 casualties.6 
As to whether collateral damage in all of its aspects, including civilian casualties,
                           can be avoided is an impossible question. It comes down to whether it is
                           acceptable to kill a civilian while he/she is at work in a ammunitions factory,
                           railway yard or utility plant, as opposed to killing him in his home which was
                           destroyed in an attack on an otherwise acceptable military target. 
The other side of the coin is whether or not there is such a thing as a
                           casualty-free conflict. One unintended result of the Gulf War is that the public
                           has come to expect minimum military casualties when our forces are committed
                           to combat. There is, however, a basic contradiction here. In many instances,
 weapons that inflict collateral damage are the ones that minimize the risk to our
                           military personnel, while civilian friendly weapons are not only more expensive
                           but increase the risk to those charged with delivering them.7 
Question:
                           If a distinction is to be made as between a limited war and total war, where does
 responsibility lie with respect to deciding which type of conflict it will be?
 Discussion: 
As to which type of war our armed forces will be asked to fight and who is to
                           decide should never be in question. The responsibility is that of the President of
 the United States. 
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Question:
                           If senior military officers become a part of the decision process, that is, decision
                           makers, with respect to which type of war will be waged, can they then in good
                           faith uphold and support the oldest of military traditions-an officer's
                           responsibility for the well being and safety of the men and women under this
 command? 
Discussion:
                           Few political leaders, whether presidents or other high level civilian decision
                           makers, are willing to unconditionally accept responsibility for deciding under
 what circumstances to commit our armed forces and accept responsibility for the
                           casualties that follow. President Harry Truman's decision to use atomic weapons
                           against Japan and to accept full responsibility for his decision, is an exception to
                           the general rule. On the other hand, the Vietnam War is a casebook study of
 where the line between traditional military decisions and political decisions
                           became indistinguishable. The debate as to where blame lies for North 
Vietnam's conquest of the South is ongoing and probably will never be agreed
 upon.8
                           In deciding the level of conflict and, by definition, the constraints imposed, the
                           Commander in Chief does not lack for civilian advice and expertise. Long
 recognized sources include the National Security Council, the State Department,
                           the Central Intelligence Agency, the President's cabinet, his civilian appointees in
                           the Department of Defense, and knowledgeable members of Congress.
                           Laying out costs in terms of casualties and material and the likelihood of success
                           of various options put forth by civilian authorities is, however, a military
                           responsibility. But tasking our military leaders to be part of the decision process
                           with respect to deciding on the level of conflict and the constraints to be imposed
                           on military action puts them in an untenable position with respect to their first
                           duty-the well being of those under their command.9 By definition, this includes
 doing all possible to minimize casualties. 
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Conclusion 
With the adoption of the American Constitution over 200 years ago, the United States asserted
              in unambiguous language that the nation's military would be subordinate to civilian authority. 
The power to declare war was delegated to the Congress.10 Also implied was that conduct of
              foreign policy rest with the Executive Branch of government. 
Throughout World War II, the different responsibilities of the military, the executive, and
              Congress in time of conflict, as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, were generally
              adhered to with little debate. After World War II, however, things changed. A Joint Chiefs of
              Staff, headed by a chairman, was specifically tasked to give advice to the President on military
              matters. The secretaries of War (Army), Navy and Air Force became subordinate to the
              Secretary of Defense with only nominal authority over the services they headed. The Office of
              the Joint Chiefs became in fact, if not name, a fourth branch of service. 
Armed conflicts became police actions, regional conflicts, people's revolutions, insurrections,
              undeclared wars, covert operations, and United Nations missions, but never total wars. When
              General Mundy stated that most of our future wars will be less than total wars he should have
              also noted that all conflicts involving American forces over the past 50 years have been less
              than total wars. 
Why conflicts in the last half of the 20th century were something less than total wars is not hard
              to understand given that the world was essentially divided into two powerful military alliances,
              each having the ability to destroy the other many times over. A declared war could escalate
              into a total war, a contingency which neither side wanted. Thus did armed conflicts become less
              than total wars with limited goals and constraints on military options while military options
              that might lead to total war were studiously avoided. In such a cold war environment decisions
              with respect to when and at what level conflicts should be fought became joint decisions
              between military and civilian leaders. And as in the case of most joint committee-type decisions,
              accountability for a particular decision made was no longer possible. The Vietnam War was a
              textbook case in this respect. Generals became politicians, politicians became generals, while
              combat forces became replaceable pawns in a seemingly never ending chess game. 
A second result of keeping conflicts at a below total war threshold was a growing public
              expectation that less than total wars, whatever they were called, should be civilian casualty free.
              Now, in the last decade of the 20th century, the world has changed again. With the collapse of
              the Soviet Union the probability of a total war on the scale of World War II has greatly
              diminished. In this new environment it is time to reexamine the decision making process which
              leads to committing American armed forces to combat. That a reexamination is called for can be
              seen in the public's resistance to committing our armed forces to conflicts where no overriding
 U.S. national interest is at stake as poll after poll has shown.
              One way to address the public's concern is a return to accountability where our civilian leaders,
              and them alone, make the decision of when to commit forces, where to commit forces, and
              what constraints are to be placed on military action.11 Once these decisions have been made,
              our military leaders become accountable for achieving civilian determined goals at the least cost
              in lives and material. But more important, those who lead can once again, in clear conscious, 
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              carry out their first dutyÑthe well being of those under their command. Field Marshall William
              Slim, commanding officer of British forces in Burma in World War II, probably said it best and
 for all time:
                           I tell you, as officers, that you will not eat, sleep, smoke, sit down, or lie down
                           until your soldiers have had a chance to do these things. If you will hold to this,
                           they will follow you to the ends of the earth. If you do not, I will break you in
                           front of your regiments. 12 
Stated another way by a civilian: 
When an officer accepts command of troops, he accepts not only the
                           responsibility of accomplishing a mission, but the guardianship of those who
                           serve under his command. The military hierarchy exists and can function
                           because enlisted personnel entrust their well-being and their lives to those with
                           command authority. When those in command authority either abdicate that
                           authority or neglect that guardianship, more is lost than lives. Lost also is the
                           trust that enables those who follow to follow those who lead. 13 
Representative Dan Daniel, In hearings on the Beirut tragedy: 
To paraphrase Field Marshall Slim. "Give our forces a clearly stated reason to
                           fight for a clearly stated end. Do all in our power to minimize the inevitable
                           casualties they will suffer, including use, as appropriate, all weapons available.
                           Do this and they will be little concerned with what the conflict is called."14 
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